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inclusion of confidential employees in the specifically excluded "supervisor" category seems to have been accepted by highly respected commentators in the field of labor law. 4 Classified as a supervisor, the confidential employee has the right to join a labor organization, but this right
seems to be of dubious value since management is not bound to recognize
him as an employee protected by the Act.75 Under the Wheeling decision,
the confidential employee may not actively divide his allegiance and expect to keep his job. For purposes of the National Labor Relations Act,
he has been placed solely on the side of management.
JOHN

C.

BALDWIN

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA OF "AGENCY
ACTION COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION
BY LAW"
The Administrative Procedure Act' contains an apparent inconsisstating that the legislative history of the 1947 amendments "clearly indicates that labor
relations and employment division personnel and confidential employees are not intended
to be protected by the Act." Id. at 610.
"MORRIS at 217 states:
Confidential employees are closely related to managerial and supervisory employees. The latter category is specifically excluded by the
Act. . . . Confidential employees . . . are not expressly excluded by the
Act, but their implied exclusion has been deemed necessary in order to
make the Act function.
Cox & BOK at 118 states that "confidential employees . . . are also excluded" from the
Act; no explanation is given.
5
National Labor Relations Act § 14(a), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970). Note
8 supra.
15 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946
(Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237) to achieve reasonable uniformity
and fairness in administrative procedures by codifying to an extent certain essential administrative rights and procedures. It was thought that such a codification would afford private
parties a means of knowing their rights and how to protect them as well as giving administrators a simple framework upon which to base their operations. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1946). Section 10 of the APA, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970),
was included to provide a simplified statement of available judicial review. Id. at 17. It has
been argued that despite the broadly remedial purpose of the APA, section 10 made no real
change in the law of reviewability. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08
(1958). Furthermore, the question has been raised whether section 10 in addition to regulating review also operates as an independent jurisdictional grant to the federal courts to review
"final agency action." Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of The Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 and "'Nonstatutory"Judicial Review of FederalAdministrative Action, 81 HARV. L.
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tency which has been the subject of a lengthy, scholarly debate.2 Section
701 of the APA reads in relevant part:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.

3

The second exception to judicial review under this section, that of agency
action committed to agency discretion by law, seemingly contradicts a
proviso found in section 706 that the reviewing court shall
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law ....4
It has been argued that section 701 (a)(2) codifies certain judicial doctrines
which courts offer as grounds for deciding that particular agency
determinations are not reviewable 5 Professor Raoul Berger insists that
the language of section 701(a)(2) notwithstanding, those agency determinations involving "abuse of discretion" or arbitrariness are always reviewable by the courts.' This argument is disputed by Professor Kenneth
REV. 308, 326-31 (1967). See also JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
165 (1965); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrativeAction: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and Parties
Defendant,
68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 443-46 (1970).
2
Berger, Administrative Arbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1965); 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness-AReply to ProfessorDavis, 114 U. PA. L. REV.783 (1966);
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U.
PA. L. REV.816 (1966); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-APostscript, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 823 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601
(1967); Davis, Administrative ArbitrarinessIs Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV.

643 (1967); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A FunctionalAnalysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A
Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16
(Supp. 1970).
35 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
These doctrines are: sovereign immunity, separation of powers, justiciability, standing,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness and others. Saferstein, Nonreviewability:
A FunctionalAnalysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 36745
5

68 (1968) (hereinafter cited as FunctionalAnalysis).

'Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965,999-1001 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Synthesis].
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Culp Davis who asserts that section 701(a)(2) most assuredly qualifies
section 706 and in fact precludes review of certain agency action even for
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion.'
Although the Berger-Davis debate appears to be highly abstract, the
importance of the controversy is underscored by the reliance courts often
place on such commentators. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Littell v. Morton" has held that despite section 701(a)(2), the
APA provides limited judicial review of an agency decision to determine
if there has been an abuse of discretion. 9 In reaching this decision, the
court "chose sides" and declared the Berger rationale to be preferable. 0
The situation in Littell" involved an attorney's claim on his contract
with the Navajo Tribe of Indians. The Secretary of the Interior denied
the compensation, deriving his authority for so doing from an 1872 statute 2 which, according to the court, "commits the decision to deny compensation to an Indian attorney to the discretion of the Secretary
..
.I'll The court, however, held reviewable an alleged abuse of the
Secretary's discretion. In reaching this decision, the court outlined the
Berger-Davis debate mentioned above 4 and concluded that review under
the APA for "abuse of discretion" was always available. 5
With respect to the other circuits, no clear-cut approach to section
701(a)(2) is readily apparent. Some of the courts stress the importance
of making a proper finding of "agency action committed to agency dis1K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 at 964 (Supp. 1970).
1445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
'The doctrine of sovereign immunity was also raised by the Secretary to preclude
review. The court held that although the doctrine was applicable in Littell, the policy reasons
for invoking sovereign immunity were not strong enough to require dismissal of this suit.
Id. at 1214.
11Id. at 1211. The court referred to the legislative history of the APA which supports
the notion that where an agency without authority or by caprice makes a decision, then it
is subject to review. However, as has been pointed out, the legislative history of the APA is
mixed and confusing although, according to Professor Davis, the strongest part of it supports a literal reading of section 701(a). 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 28.16 at 18 (Supp. 1965).
11445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
'225 U.S.C. § 82 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 21, 1872, ch. 177, § 3, 17
Stat. 137).
'3The text of the statute reads in relevant part:
the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall
determine therefrom whether, in theirjudgment, such contract or agreement has been complied with or fulfilled. ...
25 U.S.C. § 82 (1970) (emphasis added).
"Text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
15445 F.2d at 1211.
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cretion by law,"'" while for other courts such a "finding" appears to be
more of an initial assumption than a well-founded conclusion. 7 Furthermore, once these magic words have been pronounced courts will either
disregard the limitation as in Littel 8 or invoke it to justify the preclusion
of judicial interference. 19
The Presumption of Reviewability and CongressionalIntent
The position of the Supreme Court on the problem of judicial reviewability of agency determinations serves as a good starting point for an
understanding of the "agency action committed to agency discretion"
limitation of review."0 Beginning 1902 with American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty,21the Court has fashioned an underlying presumption of reviewability of administrative action22 which is rebuttable, however, by an indication of legislative intent favoring nonreviewability.2?
The Supreme Court preserved and restated this presumption in Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Gardneru where the Court considered whether Congress
had intended to forbid review of a regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. The Court emphasized that judicial review
of agency action in the interest of an aggrieved person will not be cut off
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress.2
In Abbott the sdction 701(a)(1) exception to judicial review, preclusion by a specific statutory provision, 26 seemed to be in issue. The government argued that the congressional intent to preclude review was implied
since the statute under consideration had provided review procedures for
some regulations27 but not for the ones in controversy." However, the
Court flatly rejected the government's dependence on such weak evidence
to adduce congressional intent and held that in this case judicial review
"8E.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. 1970). Text accompanying notes 7277 infra.

"7E.g., Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971). Text accompanying notes 8593 infra.

'Text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
"E.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
205 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
21187 U.S. 94 (1902).
24

K.

DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 28.07 (1958).

211d. at 3 1.
24387 U.S. 136 (1967).
211d. at 140.
215 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
2Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
-21 C.F.R. § 1.104(g)(1) (1967); 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(b)(1) (1967).
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was available."
Consistently with the emphasis in Abbott on the presumption of reviewability and the requirement of clear congressional intent to deny
review,30 the Court has in a 1971 case subjected the section 701(a)(2)
limitation to vigorous statutory analysis. 3' In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe3 2 the Court refused to find "agency action
committed to agency discretion by law." In holding reviewable the Secretary of Transportation's decision approving construction of a highway
through a public park, the Court determined that the "committed to
agency discretion" limitation was a narrow one. According to the Court,
the legislative history of the APA indicated that the section 701(a)(2)
exception applies only in those rare instances when the particular statutes
are so broad that "no law" can be found to apply.33 Since the statutes
at issue3 1 set forth specific directives for the purpose of approving highways to be constructed through parklands, plainly there was "'law to
apply' and thus the exemption for action 'committed to agency discretion'
'35
[was] inapplicable.
Generally, then, in the face of a presumption of reviewability, "only
upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. 36 This
directive would seem to apply to a statutory preclusion of review under
21387 U.S. at 141. But notice the Court's earlier use of negative implication to discover
legislative intent in Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960). Dissenting in a 5-4 decision,
Justice Brennan reminded the majority that the Court had previously "gone far towards
establishing the proposition that preclusion of judicial review of administrative action...
is not lightly to be inferred." 363 U.S. at 677.
0Text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
31
But see Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958). The second
exception, the section 701(a)(2) exemption, was the subject of the Court's inquiry in Panama
Canal Co. It was held that Congress had granted its agency, the Panama Canal Co., the
discretion of initiating proceedings for the readjustment of canal tolls. The conflict, as the
Court saw it, raged over questions of cost accounting which were peculiarly matters requiring agency expertise. 356 U.S. at 317. In light of the presumption of reviewability, the Court
can be criticized for having made no attempt to show that Congress had indeed intended to
cut off review in this case.
-401 U.S. 402 (1971).
"Id. at 410. A statute which is so "broad" could be construed as a "permissive" type
statute. See Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965)
and text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
-49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (Supp. V, 1964); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1964). The Court
emphasized that these statutes had been enacted in response to the growing public concern
about the natural environment. The purpose of the statutes was to minimize the construction
of highways through certain areas in which the highway's existence would effectively disturb
the natural beauty and surroundings. 401 U.S. at 404-05.
11401 U.S. at 413.
36
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
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section 701(a)(1) as well as to preclusion under section 701(a)(2).Y
Abuse of Discretion

As mentioned, the court in Littell held that judicial review for "abuse
of discretion" was available even in the face of an "agency action committed to agency discretion" limitation.38 Semantic problems arise, however, since the term "abuse of discretion" is used in a variety of ways.
One writer has defined discretion as "a power to make a choice within a
class of actions" 39 and abuse of discretion as "an exercise of discretion
in which a relevant consideration has been given an exaggerated, an
'unreasonable' weight at the expense of others." 40
Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit has suggested two possible definitions of "abuse of discretion." The first was presented as a "clearly
erroneous" concept (error of judgment) and the second, as a more limited
notion that discretion is abused when the action taken is extremely arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable." The latter understanding of "abuse of
discretion" would be involved if agency action
were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such
as invidious discrimination

. . .

or

. .

.on other "considerations

that Congress could not have intended to make relevant." 4
In making this distinction between erroneous judgment and judgment
which is far more than just erroneous, Judge Friendly also implied that
review for the extreme "abuse of discretion" would be available despite
section 701(a)(2). 3 It is submitted, however, that the line between the
two abuses of discretion is a very difficult one to draw. Moreover, it
appears that the courts have not settled on any one definition of abuse of
discretion.44
In addition to the Second Circuit," three other circuits have implied
nSee Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
uText accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
3
1L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION 359 (1965).

"Id. at 586.

"Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir.
1966).
11Id. at 719.
BId. at 718-19.

"For instance, it is possible that "abuse of discretion" could be used to mean that an
agency has exceeded its statutory authority or jurisdiction or has committed constitutional
error. Text accompanying notes 54-62 infra.
41Text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

366

[Vol. XXIX

that they will on occasion hold "abuse of discretion," as they may define
it, reviewable in the face of a section 701(a)(2) limitation. For instance,
Curran v. Laird" supposedly evinces the D.C. Circuit's unqualified support of the section 701(a)(2) limitation.47 Despite the holding that such
suggest the existence of a
discretion is unreviewable, dicta in Curran
8
number of limitations of nonreviewability1
These . . . instances relate to a case where there has been not
merely a contention of error or abuse of discretion, but also facts
adduced in support of a claim of the kind of bad faith, fraud, or
conscious wrongdoing which in effect undercuts the assumption
that the personnel involved have been genuinely acting as government officials. 9
In addition, three Seventh Circuit decisions specified that certain action committed to agency discretion is reviewable upon a clear showing
1
of abuse of discretion."0 Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Littell v. Morton"
has become the first circuit to hold, not just imply, that abuse of discretion, as defined by Judge Friendly,5 2 is reviewable despite the section
701(a)(2) limitation.53
46420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"7Professor Davis insists that Curran demonstrates the D.C. Circuit's view that the
section 701(a)(2) limitation prohibits review for abuse of discretion even when the official
action is "arbitrary." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 at 966-67 (Supp.
1970). But the question remains as to the definition of "arbitrary." The court emphasized
that agency action which involves personal rights and liberties, constitutional claims, and
rights expressly granted by statute were not involved in the case. 420 F.2d at 130-31. Text
accompanying notes 54-62 infra.
8
Likewise in Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the
D.C. Circuit remarked that even if it had found agency action committed to agency discretion, which it did not do in the case, nevertheless abuse of discretion would be reviewable.
Id. at 316 n.14.
"1420 F.2d at 131. "Abuse of discretion" in this sense appears to involve not merely
erroneous judgment, nor judgment which is extremely fanciful, nor agency action in excess
of statutory authority, jurisdiction, or the Constitution. The action alluded to would seem
to connote a sense of criminality on the part of the individual decision-maker.
5
°Velasco v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968); Kladis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d
513, 515 (7th Cir. 1965); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 1960).
5445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
52

In deciding that "abuse of discretion" would be reviewable, the court in Littell stated
that Judge Friendly's formulation of the extreme abuse of discretion would define the
"scope of this limited review." In other words, the court would seem to allow review for
"any" alleged abuse of discretion, the scope of review being limited, however, to deciding
if that abuse were an extreme one in the sense of Judge Friendly's definition. 445 F.2d at
1211.
5Id.
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A Review of the Circuits

In perceiving the differing circuit approaches to the effect of a section
701(a)(2) limitation, it can be helpful to keep in mind not only the Supreme Court's insistence that clear legislative intent is needed when a
court restricts reviewability but also the significance of the introductory
clause of section 701(a) of the APA: "except to the extent that." 54 The
opening words are not "except when" but "except to the extent that." 55
The question thus is not "whether agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion but to what extent agency action is so committed.""
Thus written, the introductory clause of section 701(a) has been construed as a restriction on section 701(a)'s preclusion of reviewability.57 In
other words, only "to the extent that" -Congress has committed the action
to agency discretion will review be barred. Exemplary of this construction
is that several circuits have indicated that despite the secton 701 (a) limitation they may nevertheless grant review if an agency has exceeded its
statutory authority or breached a statutory duty,58 committed constitutional error,59 or exceeded its jurisdiction. 0 This approach was demonstrated by the D.C. Circuit in Scanwell Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer."l

The court stated that it will invade the forbidden domain of administrative discretion when it is apparent that the agency has stepped outside its
statutory perimeter, the theory being that once outside the perimeter the
discretion no longer exists."2
Reasoning in a similar fashion, the Ninth Circuit, in deciding whether
review under the APA should be precluded by section 701(a)(2), drew a
63 between "permissive" and
distinction in Ferry v. Udal1
"mandatory"
54

Text accompanying note 3 supra.
-The original version of section 701 read "except so far as" but in its codified form
reads "except to the extent that." Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 10, 60
Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970)). The change is neither relevant nor important to our present discussion.
114 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08 at 33 (1958) (emphasis added).
Thus the section 701(a)(2) exemption from review is not an all or nothing limitation. Id. at
33-34.
5FunctionalAnalysis at 369-70.
uLangevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1251 (1st Cir. 1970); North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney,
428 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1970).
5
1Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1251 (1st Cir. 1970).
eId.
6424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
12 d. at 874.
3336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
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type statutes.6 4 Recognizing that almost every agency action involves
some discretion, the court in Ferry sought to restrict review "to the extent
that" the action really is committed to agency discretion." The method
to be used in ascertaining to what extent the agency is vested with the
discretion involves construing the statute under which the agency derives
its authority for the decision in question. Where administrative discretion
is limited to deciding whether statutory requirements have been met, the
statute is a "mandatory type" and the agency must take action which is
then subject to review. Where the agency still has discretion to refuse to
act even when statutory requirements have been met, the statute is "permissive," and the discretion exercised is nonreviewable.66 Although this
distinction may be nebulous, 7 the court seems to recognize the importance of statutory analysis."8 Furthermore, the appeal of the Ninth Circuit
approach is evidenced by its apparent acceptance by the Sixth Circuit. 9
It is possible that the Eighth Circuit also follows the Ninth Circuit
approach. In Jones v. Freeman, a case involving an attempt by the
United States Forest Service to keep razorback hogs from foraging in a
national forest, the Eighth Circuit held that the agency action of impounding the hogs was reviewable. Although it is not clear on what
grounds this decision was actually based, the court did indicate that the
"committed to agency discretion" limitation applied only "to the extent
that" such discretion existed. The court then cited to Ferry and implied
that the statute involved was a "mandatory type." 7'
In contrast to the limited approach of the Ninth Circuit, the First
Circuit thoroughly analyzes various factors in determining whether
agency action is reviewable. The question the First Circuit faced in Hahn
"E.g., Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Walker,
409 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1969).
F.2d at 711-12.
91336
6
1Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1969).
7
For an extended discussion on the distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive"
type statutes, see Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 904 (1965).
"SFor a favorable reaction to the Ninth Circuit approach, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 at 968 (Supp. 1970). For adverse comment, see Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and Functional
Analysis at 397.
"Once the Sixth Circuit has found "agency action committed to agency discretion," it
appears that it will bar review. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 732 (6th
Cir. 1964). In order to ascertain whether or not-to what extent-the action is so
committed, a Sixth Circuit case, Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353
(6th Cir. 1968), has followed the Ninth Circuit approach. Id. at 358.
70400 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968).
7
Id. at 390.
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v. Gottlieb7 1 was whether tenants in federally subsidized housing have the
right to an administrative hearing and judicial review when their landlord
proposes a rent increase. With regard to possible review, the court recognized the section 701(a)(2) limitation as well as the "strong presumption
in favor of review, which is overcome only by 'clear and convincing
evidence' that Congress intended to cut off review above the agency
level.1 73 The court then discussed the problems involved in deciding what
Congress had intended and concluded that in the absence of clear congressional intent, three factors seems determinative of the requisite intent:
first, the appropriateness of the issue raised for review by the
courts; second, the need for judicial supervision to safeguard the
interests of the plaintiffs; and third, the impact of review on the
7
effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its assigned role.
Applying these three factors to the problem at hand, the court concluded that deciding whether or not rent increases were necessary involved complex questions of economics which were not appropriate for
the courts. 75 Secondly, although there was a need for judicial intervention
to protect tenants in federally subsidized low-rent housing, other forms
of relief, such as rent supplements, were available to them. In addition,
the court reasoned that the interests of the plaintiffs might be hurt more
by a judicially-imposed system of review of all rent increases than by the
single rent increase itself: the delay, the frictions and the costs engendered
by constant litigation might lead to increased rentals, as well as less
participation in these housing projects by private investors. Finally, with
regard to the impact of review on agency effectiveness, the court felt that
the frequency with which Federal Housing Authority rent-increase considerations can recur (as the many different leases expire) would render
judicial review of these increases unduly burdensome on the agency by
retarding and complicating its work. Furthermore, since the FHA's specific role in this area is to help provide needy families with low-income
housing, the necessary involvement of private investors would be substantially discouraged through an additional increment of governmental interference.76
The court in Hahn concluded that, on the basis of the above analysis,
2430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. 1970). This case is commented upon in the special student
project Reviewability of Matters Committed to Agency Discretion, 197! DUKE L.J. 312.
73430 F.2d at 1249.
74

1d.

15Id. This first factor appears to have been the basis of the Supreme Court's holding
of nonreviewability in Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317-19 (1958).
Note 31 supra.
7430 F.2d at 1250.
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Congress had meant to preclude judicial review of FHA rent-increase
approval and that such approval was therefore a matter committed to
agency discretion by law.7 The First Circuit approach thus stresses substantial analysis of both statutory provisions and certain practical problems in ascertaining whether Congress has intended the section 701(a)(2)
limitation to apply.
The Second Circuit in Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc.78 criticized
part of the Hahn "test" 7 but nevertheless based its decision of nonreviewability of an agency decision on factors similar to the ones employed in
0
Likewise in Kletschka v. Drivers' the court engaged in a similar
Hahn."
analysis and prohibited review in a case involving the Veterans Administration.
With regard to a Hahn-type approach, the argument has been made
that a court's analysis of such factors as agency expertise, managerial
nature of an agency, impropriety of judicial intervention, and necessity
of informal agency decision-making may indicate a "presumption of nonreviewability. ''8 2 However, the First Circuit's understanding of these factors as only being dispositive of the required congressional intent to show
"agency action committed to agency discretion" seems more consistent
with the Supreme Court's position in Abbott, i.e., the court begins an
analysis weighted with the presumption of reviewability u On the other
hand, other approaches can be construed as indicating a presumption of
nonreviewability;84 and although the result reached may be the same in
cases similar to the ones discussed, different presumptions can lead, of
course, to different conclusions.
1Id. at 1251.
78447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971).
7
The court in Langevin indicated it could see no reason why a court was not equipped
to pass on the reasonableness of a rent increase. Id. at 303.
801n precluding review the court looked to such factors as the managerial nature of the
responsibilities confided to the FHA, the need for expeditious agency action, and the quantity of appeals which might result from a holding of reviewability. Id. at 303.
8411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969).
8
"Compare Synthesis at 965 with FunctionalAnalysis at 377-95.
13Text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
8
n neither Kletschka nor Langevin did the court even mention the "presumption of
reviewability" nor the requirement that clear congressional intent was needed to cut off
review of administrative action. See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra. In both instances
the court seemed to begin its analysis weighted with a presumption of nonreviewability.
Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971); Kletschka v. Driver,
411 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 1969).
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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Littell v. Morton

The possible abuse of discretion in Littells apparently stemmed from
a background of prior litigation between Littell and the Secretary, litigation which had been characterized as an "unseemly squabble.""6 The
court therefore held that review for "abuse of discretion" was always
available even though the Secretary's denial of compensation had been
"agency action committed to agency discretion by law," the section
701(a)(2) limitation on review. The court, however, engaged in no analysis to decide if a section 701(a)(2) limitation were applicable. Since the
court in Littell referred at the end of the decision to the problems of
contract interpretation and the absence of agency expertise in this area
of the law,87 it is arguable that the Secretary's decision was not really one
"committed to agency discretion by law."
Instead of assuming the section 701(a)(2) limitation to be applicable,
the court could have engaged in an analysis similar to that employed in
Hahn." For instance, the court could have begun an analysis of the
situation weighted with the presumption of reviewability. It could have
inquired whether Congress really intended the Littell contract decision to
have been committed to agency discretion for the purposes of the section
701(a)(2) limitation. In other words, although the Secretary of Interior
could exercise his discretion in determining whether or not the contract
had been complied with, it is plausible that this fact does not necessarily
mean that Congress meant to preclude review of such a decision.
To begin with, the statute granting the Secretary his discretion dates
back to 1872, long before the Administrative Procedure Act was enacted89
to provide more opportunity for judicial review of administrative decisions.8 In addition, the principles of contract interpretation seem appropriate for judicial review, which conclusion the court in Littell reached
at the end of its opinion. 1 In view of the "unseemly squabble" between
the plaintiff and the Secretary, judicial supervision to safeguard Littell's
interests would appear warranted. Finally, the argument could be made
that review of such contract decisions would not operate as too great a
burden on the Department of the Interior and would not significantly
impede the agency's particular role in paying over monies due attorneys
"Text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
"Littell v. Hickel, 314 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (D.Md. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Littell v.
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
"445 F.2d at 1214.
8"Text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
"Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.
"Note I supra.
"'445 F.2d at 1214.
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who have performed services for Indians. 2
The above analysis, following basically an approach set out by the
First Circuit in Hahn, could lead to the conclusion that Congress did not
intend to commit the Secretary of Interior's decision to agency discretion
by law, at least for the purposes of precluding review. To put it another
way, Congress did not intend to commit the agency action to agency
discretion "to the extent that" such action would be nonreviewable.9 3
The advantage of such an analysis would appear to lie in the necessity of
a closer examination of the statute and the nature of the issues in controversy viewed in the light of both the agency's particular function and the
presumption of judicial reviewability.
Conclusion
It has been urged that courts "enter into fuller analyses of the composite of factors that justify a holding of nonreviewability." 4 Confusion
has resulted, it seems, through viewing the "committed-to-agencydiscretion doctrine" as a magical category which, once invoked, ends
thought and blinds the court to further possibilities. 5 A converse argument might be made in cases such as Littell where reviewability is upheld.
In Littell the court assumed the applicability of the section 701(a)(2)
limitation and then brushed it aside, holding that review for "abuse of
discretion" was always available. It is arguable that agency action is
never committed to agency discretion "to the extent that" such discretion
is abused. However, it is often hard for a court to determine whether
allegations of abuse of discretion have any factual support.17 The court
was aided in Littell by the reported court history of the "unseemly squab2
9'
Text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
rl'he contention that the language "to the extent that" keeps section 701(a)(2) from
being an all or nothing limitation, 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08 at
33-34 (1958), is usually thought to refer to the degree of discretion which is reviewable, i.e.,
"scope of review." See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673 (D.C.

Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972); Functional Analysis at 369-70. The

difficulty in drawing the line between reviewable and nonreviewable abuse of discretion has
already been discussed. Text accompanying notes 38-52 supra. Furthermore, as the D.C.
Circuit points out in Curran v. Laird, even a "restricted review requires probing the surface
and going beyond mere conclusory affidavits." 420 F.2d 122, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Such a
review thus belies the notion that the matters are in fact committed to agency discretion.
Id. at 132-33. It appears then that the language "to the extent that" can operate as a
limitation on section 701(a)(2) in the sense that Congress only meant to commit the action
to agency discretion "to the extent that" it meant to preclude review of that action.
94

Functional Analysis at 396.
'11d. at 396-98.

9
9

This appears to be Professor Berger's basic thesis. Synthesis at 968-69.

7See Functional Analysis at 374-75.

